Curbing the Courts: The Constitution and the Limits of Judicial Power by McDowell, Gary L.
University of Richmond
UR Scholarship Repository
Law Faculty Publications School of Law
1988
Curbing the Courts: The Constitution and the
Limits of Judicial Power
Gary L. McDowell
University of Richmond, gmcdowel@richmond.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/law-faculty-publications
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States
Commons
This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Gary L. McDowell, Curbing the Courts: The Constitution and the Limits of Judicial Power (Louisiana State University Press 1988).
CURBING THE COURTS 
THE CONSTITUTION AND 
THE LIMITS OF 
JUDICIAL POWER 
GARY L. McDOWELL 
" 
LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY PRESS 
BATON ROUGE AND LONDON 
Copyright © 1988 by Louisiana State University Press 
All rights reserved 
Manufactured in the United States of America 
Designer 
Sylvia Loftin 
Typeface 
English Times 
Typesetter 
Focus Graphics 
Printer 
Thomson-Shore, Inc. 
Binder 
John H. Dekker & Sons, Inc. 
IO 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 
Library of Congress Cataloging-In-Publication Data 
McDowell, Gary L., 1949-
Curbing the courts : the Constitution and the limits of judicial 
power I Gary L. McDowell. 
p. cm. 
Includes indexes. 
ISBN 0-8071-1339-5 
I. Courts-United States. 2. Political questions and judicial 
power-United States. 3. United States-Constitutional law. 
4. Legislative power-United States. I. Title. 
KF8700.M37 1988 
347.73'1-dc 19 
[347.3071] 87-24139 
CIP 
Grateful acknowledgment is made to the publishers of the following journals and 
monographs, wherein parts of this work first appeared: Public Interest, LXVJI 
(Spring, 1982); Journal of Contemporary Studies, VII (Summer, 1984); The Legal 
System Assault on the Economy (Washington, D.C., 1986); and Constitutional 
Commentary: The Constitution and Contemporary Constitutional Theory 
(Washington, D.C., 1985). 
CONTENTS 
PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
xi 
INTRODUCTION 
A MODEST REMEDY FOR 
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 
1 
ONE 
THE CONSTITUTION AND CONTEMPORARY 
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
13 
TWO 
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE 
REPUBLICAN IDEA OF JUSTICE 
65 
THREE 
THE PECULIAR SECURITY OF 
A WRITTEN CONSTITUTION 
95 
FOUR 
CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION 
AND THE COURTS 
114 
FIVE 
RESPONSES TO JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 
134 
Contents 
SIX 
THE FORMS AND LIMITS OF 
JUDICIAL POWER 
168 
EPILOGUE 
RIGHTS, REMEDIES, AND RESTRAINT: 
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE 
LIMITS OF JUDICIAL POWER 
197 
CASE INDEX 
207 
INDEX 
209 
x 
nts 
D LIMITS OF 
POWER 
JUE 
AND RESTRAINT: 
ION AND THE 
:IAL POWER 
DEX 
x 
PREFACE 
AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
During the past thirty years or so two remarkable developments have 
been taking place in the way people think about the role of the judi-
ciary under the Constitution. On one hand, the Supreme Court has 
grown increasingly bold in proclaiming itself to be the ultimate inter-
preter of the Constitution; the belief seems to be that there is no mean-
ingful distinction between the Constitution and constitutional Jaw. 
The Constitution has become in the eyes of many (as Charles Evans 
Hughes once quipped) merely "what the judges say it is."1 
On the other hand, it is widely asserted today that judges and other 
public officials- but especially judges - are not bound by the text or 
original understanding of the Constitution. A common scholarly sen-
timent is that fidelity to text and intention need not be considered the 
touchstones of constitutional decisionmaking. Indeed, this scholarly 
sentiment has now been adopted by a growing number of jurists. Jus-
tice William Brennan, for example, has argued that the belief that a 
judge can divine the original intention of the Constitution is "little 
more than arrogance cloaked as humility." For Justice Brennan and 
his kind the main touchstone of constitutional interpretation is con-
temporary economic, social, and political realities. The Constitution, 
in this view, is unmoored and impermanent; it is a living constitution 
with an ideological vengeance.' 
The practical consequence of these two doctrinal developments has 
been a judiciary increasingly immersed in what can only be called policy 
making. As the procedural requirements governing the judicial process 
- standing to sue, class actions, consent decrees, and so forth-have 
been loosened, judges have increasingly taken the plunge into the ad-
ministrative minutiae of the policy process. And their opinions have 
reflected this substantive shift. Many judges have developed a knack, 
as Henry Monaghan has said, "of writing constitutional opinions that 
look like detailed legislative codes." Further, and more troubling, the 
Supreme Court has "fostered the impression that every detailed rule 
1 Hughes quoted in Henry J. Abraham, The Judicial Process (4th ed.; New York, 
1980). 324. See also Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
1 William J. Brennan, "Construing the Constitution," University of California, 
Davis Law Review, XIX (1985). 4. 
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Preface and Acknowledgments 
laid down has the same dignity as the constitutional text itself." More 
than a few commentators have now joined Monaghan in his belief that 
such an impression is simply a constitutional "illusion." 3 
Although throughout our history there have always been calls for 
radical political responses to what have been deemed judicial excesses 
and the presumption of judicial power, no period in our history has 
equaled either in duration or intensity the current period of antijudi-
cial sentiment. What has been especially striking about this era, which 
began to emerge around 1954 with the advent of Warren Court activ-
ism, is the marked lack of success of political retaliations against this 
so-called government by judiciary. While judges have taken over the 
operation of school boards, mental health facilities, and prisons, their 
critics have fumed and fussed but little more. Judicial activism has 
come to be much like Charles Dudley Warner's weather: Everybody 
talks about it but nobody does anything. 
This book is an effort to point toward an old but largely ignored 
way by which judicial power may be effectively curbed within the pru-
dent guidelines provided by the Constitution itself. Article III of the 
Constitution provides that judicial power is subject not only to any ex-
ceptions Congress may see fit to make to appellate jurisdiction, but 
also to "such Regulations as the Congress shall make." While many 
critics of judicial activism have approached the problem from the per-
spective of carving out politically dramatic jurisdictional exceptions, 
few have looked to the power of Congress to regulate the procedures 
of the judicial process. However, the most effective way to curb the 
courts is through the various procedural arrangements that serve to 
guide and hem in the exercise of substantive judicial power. 
As with any scholarly undertaking, a good many friends and col-
leagues lent their support along the way. Their willingness to read and 
criticize the manuscript- and, most of all, their persistence in attempt-
ing to convince me of the error of my ways in a good many instances-
is greatly appreciated. Where their sharp eyes, clear minds, and good 
hearts prevailed, this book is much the better. I am especially indebted 
to Walter Berns, William A. Schambra, Eugene W. Hickok, Jr., J ef-
frey L. Sedgwick, David Nichols, Nathan Glazer, Paul Peterson, Soti-
rios A. Barber, Ralph A. Rossum, George Friedman, Richard G. 
3 Henry Monaghan, "Supreme Court 1974 Term Foreword: Constitutional Com-
mon Law," Harvard Law Review, LXXXVII (1974), 1, 2. 
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Preface and Acknowledgments 
Stevens, David O'Brien, Peter Schultz, Charles J. Cooper, and Terry 
Eastland for their helpful comments on portions of the book. 
Jn many ways, William Kristol's research and thinking on these is-
sues made this project possible. Bill pointed me in directions I had not 
considered. The constant support- both moral and financial - of 
James McClellan and the Center for Judicial Studies made this a far 
easier task than it otherwise would have been. 
John Agresto's careful reading of the entire manuscript provided 
me an especially rich opportunity for second thoughts. His many com-
ments and suggestions taught me a great deal about the Constitution 
and constitutional law; my stubborn resistance no doubt deprived me 
of a good deal more. 
Stephen J. Markman, then chief counsel of the Subcommittee on the 
Constitution of the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate, 
was kind enough to read the sections dealing with the legislative history 
of court-curbing efforts. His encyclopedic knowledge of the subject and 
his suggestions were essential to the completion of the book. 
My family offered unfaltering support and encouragement through-
out this often seemingly endless project. Victoria Kuhn faithfully 
typed, read, and offered her usual gentle suggestions on the manu-
script. Such a friend is rare indeed. Ron Tomalis and Eric Jaso were 
especially helpful in rendering the manuscript ready for publication. 
This book grew from a paper I gave at a conference entitled "Judi-
cial Power in the United States: What are the Appropriate Con-
straints?" sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute and held in 
Washington, D.C., on October 1 and 2, 1981. I am especially grateful 
to Bill Schambra for arranging for that invitation. As the project de-
veloped, it was generously supported by a grant from the Institute for 
Educational Affairs. Philip Marcus' early confidence in the ideas de-
veloped here is truly appreciated. The grant allowed me the luxury of 
spending a year as a Fellow in Law and Political Science at the Har-
vard Law School. Harold J. Berman, John Hart Ely, Paul Bator, and 
Abram Chayes made that year one of the most intellectually invigo-
rating I have known. Although they obviously did not always con-
vince me, they nevertheless made me see things and think about things 
in new ways. For that I am especially grateful. 
The opportunity to conduct a study group on curbing the courts at 
the Institute of Politics at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government 
during the academic year 1981-82 was a rare opportunity to work 
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through a good many ideas at the most important, formative stages. 
Those who participated in that seminar-especially Nathan Glazer, 
Abram Chayes, Henry Abraham, Eugene Hickok, and Hrach Grego-
rian- contributed much to my efforts to think about the virtues and 
vices of judicial power under the Constitution. 
I owe a special debt to Raoul Berger. His Government by Judiciary: 
The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment was the intellec-
tual spark that first set fire to my scholarly interest in these matters. 
Since then, during the time this book was in progress, I have had the 
pleasure not only of his teaching but also of his friendship. For both, I 
am very grateful indeed. 
Last but not least, this volume is dedicated to a man who has been a 
constant source of inspiration and direction to me, first through his 
books and essays, and then when I became hir student at the Univer-
sity of Virginia in 1977. In the strictest sense, this work would not 
have been possible without him. Such is the influence of truly great 
teachers. 
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